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EMMANUEL UDOGU 
NATIONAL INTEGRATION ATTEMPTS IN 
NIGERIAN POLITICS 1979-1984 
. Nigeria, a count?-'y located on the west coast of Africa, had a population 
estlIr,tll;ted at approXlm:ately one hundred fifteen million people in 1989. It was 
~ Bntlsh creatlo~, d~t~n~ back to ~861, w.hen the Royal Navy occupied Lagos 
the prese~t. capItal! In Its .campalgn ag~nst the slave trade. Nigeria emerged 
as a geopolitIcal entlty Ol!-ly In 1914, when Its northern and southern regions be-
came amalgamated. Dunng the gradual expansion into the interior, the British 
"invented" the name Nigeria. Nigeria remained a British protectorate until 1 
October 1960, when it gained independence. Since then, Nigeria has endured 
several political crises, and fought a civil war (1967-1970). It has been argued 
that the dominance of the northern region, both in area and population over 
the southern regions, was partly responsible for the breakdown of civilian rule 
in 1966. Subsequently, General Yakubu Gowan's regime (1967-1975) divided 
the regions into twelve states. In 1976, General Murtala Muhammed (Gowan's 
successor) created seven new states to fulfill what he construed to be legitimate 
demands for self-determination. 
Tables 1 and 2 reveal the ethnolinguistic categories and distribution of se-
lected groups in 1963. Despite the existence of numerous ethnic groups, only 
three-the Haus8., Yoruba, and lbo-composed 58% of Nigeria's population. An 
additional ei~teen "tribes" numbered 31.7%, and others of local significance 
came to 10.3'70. Historically, the Hausas, Yorubas, and Ibos have dominated 
Nigerian politics. Under the provisions of Article 202B of the 1979 Constitution, 
the minority groups (42%) have been given increased political participation. 
Nigeria, which became a republic in 1963, was governed by a civilian regime 
from 1960 to 1966, and from early 1966 to late 1979 it came under military rule. 
In 1979, it returned to civilian control as the Second Republic, and in December 
1983 reverted to a military government. The collapse of the Second Republic 
may have been due to economic anarchy and social disorder, but few will deny 
the role of the political malaise created by ethnic politics.(1) Ali Mazrui has 
noted that ethnicity played a vital role in the politics of the Second Republic 
despi te the major politicians I public disavowals.(2) This. study e?tplores Nig~ria's 
ethnic politics vil-a-ui. the dual processes of natIonal mtegr.atlO.n and ~a.honal 
cohesion and evaluates the effectiveness of the 1979 ConshtutIon, whIch was 
designed'to address this political dilemma. 
Many Nigeria.ns regard et.hnici~y as a ~en~itive issue .. No~etheless, for the 
first time, the country dealt wlth thIS q~estlon m the Co~stltutlOn of th"e Se.cond 
Republic. Perhaps because of the delIcacy of the. ~OPIC, the words naho,nal 
character" became a euphemism for ethnic composltl~n (~ for example AI.h~le 
203B). The major concern of the fra.mers of the constitution ,,!as how, eth,nlclty 
could be regulated in Nigerian politics. The need ~o. address th18 question I!, the 
Second Republic issued from the belief that ethmclty had tended to dommate 
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politics in Nigeria, a situation that was not conducive to national integration, 
because ethnic groups promoted their interests with little or no reference to 
those of the nation-state. 
A cautious superimposition of a nation-state's interests over those of ethnic 
groups might serve as a positive step towards national integration. This is not 
to suggest that each group(3) might not pursue its own interests within the 
framework of the nation-state. Rather, special interest groups should realize 
that, in the final analysis, the nation-state's interests should supersede those of 
any ethnic collectivi.ty. This, in turn, might encourage what Bolaji Akinyemi 
refened to as maximal unity, that is, "the transference of loyalties from subna-
tional primordial units to one of [the] nation-state."(4) In other words, if the 
heterogeneous groups could be persuaded that they might best maximize their 
interests through devotion to the nation-state, their desire to support the higher 
polity, i.e., the nation-state, might be enhanced. 
Scholars have shown an intense interest concerning this subject.(5) M. Craw-
ford Young challenged scholars in the case of India and Nigeria to explore the 
hypothesis that "cultural complexity will playa positive role in national inte-
gration if the policy is so structured as to draw advantage from it."(6) Sam Egite 
Oyovbaire enunciated a somewhat different hypothesis: "Although the Nigerian 
political system is composed of multiple communities with distinct cultures and 
patterns of authority there is nothing lui generi, about the politica.l si~nifi­
cance of these communities for the long term operation of the Nigerian pohtical 
system."(7) These hypotheses might bewilder many observers of the Nigerian 
political system, in view of Nigeria's historical existence, in which the forces of 
ethnic loyalty created severe conflicts after independence, because the various 
authority patterns among the major groups retarded the national integration 
process. 
Young's hypothesis suggests that cultural complexity could further national 
integration if the polity was "adequately" structured, but this has not yet oc-
curred in Ni~eria. Possibly, more than structural changes are needed to engen-
der national mtegration. For example, superb and adequate as the Westminstel 
parliamentary model is for the United Kingdom and Canada, and splendid as 
the presidential system is for the United States, both these structures failed to 
function in Nigeria. Ali Mazrui has noted that the parliamentary system that 
Great Britain transferred to the colonies did not succeed in many instances, 
either. In order for a political. system to attain its objective, he argued, "the 
structure of ~overnment has to have roots and a sense of tradition."(8) In Nige-
ria, the parliamentary and presidential systems probably failed because they 
lacked longevity. 
On the other hand, Oyovbaire has argued that, were the Nigerian collectiv-
ities left alone within the nation-state to function in a "laissez-faire" manner, 
the system would somehow regulate itself and create political stability. These 
hypotheses not only appear to provide contradictory solutions to the same prob-
lem, they also elucidate the complexity of the subject matter. Moreover, the 
recurrence of traditional sub-systems in the Nigerian polity(9) makes national 
integration difficult, because traditional politics tend to nourish what Walker 
Connor termed ethnonationalism.(lO) 
One of the chief concerns of ethnic nationalism, or ethnic autonomy,(ll) is 
based on the notion that, in heterogeneous societies, the potential for conflict 
is heightened by the degree and sile of the various ethnic groups.(12) Further-
more, in a plural societY(13) competitive politics are founded on ethnic politics 
based on who gets what, when, and how. The struggle for the authoritative al-
location of values therefore rallies groups to unite around what Clifford Geertz 
termed "primordial sentiments."(14) Geerts noted: "The network of primordial 
alliance and opposition is a dense, intricate, but yet precisely articulated one, 
the product, in most cases, of centuries of gradual crystallization. The unfamil-
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iar civil state, born yesterday from the meager remains of an exhausted colonial 
regime, is superimposed upon this spun and lovingly conserved texture of pride 
and suspicion and must somehow contrive to weave it into the fabric of modern 
politics." (15) 
The key, then, to the success of ethnic nationalism is that it must offer 
the ethnic nationalists easy access to mobilize the group in the struggle for 
the national distribution of goods and services. Robert Kea.rney agrees with 
this view: "The community frequently is the most inclusive group possessing a 
claim on the loyalty of the individual and with which he can readily identify. 
An individual is born into a community, and membership in that community 
and exclusion from a.ll others remain with him throughout his life .... "(16) As A. 
Rabushka and K. A. Shepsle have noted, a sense of communal solidarity tends to 
intensify ethnic preference, so much so, that in the struggle for political power 
to promise less for one's group in the name of harmony and accommodation 
was equivalent to betraying that group's interests.(17) This is not only true in 
the politics of developing countries, but also in developed sta.tes or nation-states 
such as Canada(18) and the Soviet Union.(19) 
Ethnic nationalism has been defined as that unity which is common among 
peoples of a particular group. Such a unity could be social or political. It is 
said to be social if it involves in part the promotion of the cultural, linguistic, 
racial, and caste affinities of a group of people. It is political if it implies politi-
cal allegiance or political loyalty to one's collectivity that has the propensity of 
creating micronationalisms(20) within a nation-state. For example, G. Almond 
and J. S. Coleman's study on political socialization in Africa observed the ex-
istence of particularism,(21) i.e., the belief that a specific group had the right 
to promote its own specific interests without reference to those of any larger 
or more inclusive entity. The latter attitude, argued Basil Davidson, destroyed 
any organic unification.(22) 
The birth of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria predates the postcolonial era, 
although its significance gathered momentum before and after independence, 
when the struggle for power and the survival of each group became the rallying 
cry of the area's political leaders. Indeed, the British had emphasized fortifying 
the Nigerian tribal groups' ethnic walls. Governor Sir Hugh Clifford's assertion 
before the Nigerian council on 29 December 1920, underscored this policy: " ..• .It 
is the consistent policy of the government of Nigeria to maintain and support 
the local tribal institutions and the indigenous forms of government ... which are 
to be regarded as the natural expression of r African] political genius .... r am 
entirely convinced of the right, for example, of the people of Egbaland ... or any 
of the great emirates of the North ... to maintain that each one of them is, in a 
very real sense, a nation .... lt is the task of the government of Nigeria to build up 
and fortify these national institutions. "(23) Clearly, Governor Clifford regarded 
the creation of an integrated Nigerian entity which would bring the diverse 
ethnic elements together into a closer union as politically unfeasible-a.t that 
time perhaps a justifiable viewpoint. 
He wondered, furthermore, if it was possible to unite the various groups, 
and if so, what would be the consequences of such a unity in Nigeria. "As-
suming ... that the impossible were feasible-that this collection of self-contained 
and mutually independent Native states, separated from one another, as many 
of them are, by great distance, by difference of history and traditions and by 
ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers, were indeed 
capable of being welded into a single homogeneous nation-a deadly blow would 
be thereby struck at the very root of national self-government in Nigeria which 
secures to each separate people the right to maintain its identity, its individu-
ality and its nationality, its own chosen form of government; and the peculill.r 
political and social institutions which have been evolved for it by the wisdom 
and by the accumulated experiences of generations of its forebearers."(24) 
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Many observers might dismiss this statement as mere exaggeration of the 
political reality in Nigeria, and note that in Europe and North America, except 
in a few cases, cultural diversities have not proven centrifugal. Indeed, many 
have pointed to the enrichin~ characteristics of diversity in the United States 
and elsewhere. But how true It is within the Nigerian context that cultural and 
ethnic diversities do not impede national integration? This, of course, remains 
one of the central foci of this study. 
However, Governor Cliiford's affirmation should not be dismissed without 
an allusion to the idea that it served as a self-fulfilling prophecy. This was so 
because it launched each collectivity on its path, pursuing its own interests at the 
expense of national unity. Thus, few were surprised when in 1947 Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo, one of Nigeria's founding fathers, underlined the problem of ethnic 
differences: "Nigeria is not a nation [that is a single united nation-state1: it is a 
mere geographic expression."(25) Also, in his lecture at St. Pancreas Townhall 
in London, he emphasized, inter alia, "that Nigeria is a British creation; that 
Ni~eria consists of a multiplicity of races who are as different from one another 
as ~thel races of Europe; rand] that for about 43 years, the British have striven to 
umte these diverse peopfes ... "(26) Although the first two points appear logical, 
noted Victor OlOl:unsola, the third point, he contended, was overly stressed. But 
such an idea, which many Nigerians shared, probably impelled the secessionist 
Put.rch by the former eastern Nigeria that culminated in the temporary creation 
of the Republic of Biafra and triggered the ensuing civil war in the 1960s. 
Following independence, many Africanists suggested that because Africa 
had many ethnic groups, national integration would become a major objective 
fOJ: the newly independent states.(27) This, allegedly, would help to mitigate 
the "evils" of ethnic politics and create political stability. For the past several 
years, however] observers of African politics have become disillusioned. They 
claim that natlOnal integration is perhaps not the proper solution to the po-
litical problems confronting African states. Consequently, they have suggested 
national cohesion as a better tool for the analysis of the issue of African ethnic 
cleavages.(28 ) 
Scholars have been seriously reassessing the concept of national integra.-
tion. As they examine African politics they wonder about its validity.(29) They 
have been seeking an alternative framework to national integration. Concep-
tually, a political system is said to be integrated if the units, that is, its indi-
vidual political sectors, develop, in the course of political interaction, a pool of 
commonly accepted norms regarding political behaviour patterns legitimized by 
these norms.(30) 
For Ernest Ha.as, this concept mea.ns "a process whereby political actors in 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new center, whose institution possesses or demands 
jurisdiction over pre-existing Nation-states."(31) J. Coleman and G. Rosberg 
conceived national integra.tion as the "progressive bridging of the elite-mass 
gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political 
process and a participant community."(32) 
Henry Teune, on the other ha.nd, asserted that national integration was a 
psychological notion and consequently defined the concept in the following psy-
chological dimensions: (1) the degree to which the national government is a 
relevant set of stimuli for the individual, that is, whether there is some minimal 
level of knowledge about the national government; (2) the degree to which the 
individual considers the national government capable of influencing his welfare 
or is important in his every-day activities; (3) the degree to which the individ-
ual responds favourably to the national government; and (4) the degree of the 
individual concern for the people living within the same country but outside of 
his immediate environment.(33) 
Leonard Binder conceptualized national integration as the process of cre-
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ating intra-state consensus, especially the bridging of the elite-mass gap.(34) 
Karl Deutsch perceived national integration in a roughly similar sense.(35) In 
the case of Africa, at least, Richard Sklar noted that "in so far as national in-
tegration contemplates the creation of higher loyalties that supersede parochial 
loyalties to subnational communities (tribes), language groups, or regions, it is 
a universally acclaimed goal of the African renaissance. "(36) 
It is nearly three decades since the independence of Nigeria was proclaimed. 
Yet, ethnic loyalties have not withered away, and national integration has not 
been attained.(37) The basic problem of national integration in Nigeria has 
two dimensions: (1) How to elicit from subjects deference and devotion to the 
claim of the state. This means converting ethnic nationalism to nation-state 
nationalism; and (2) how to increase normative consensus governing political 
behaviour among members of the political system.(38) This means that the 
problem of national integration entails developing a political culture and urging 
the people's commitment to it. 
The existence of such problems in Nigeria and elsewhere probably prompted 
Crawford Young not only to reevaluate the condition for national integration 
but also to wonder "if the pathway to nation-building is not simply longer and 
more tortuous than was initially supposed, or is it perhaps a cul-de-sac'l"(39) 
Egite Oyovbaire also challenged the traditional mode of definitions. He ar-
gued instead that they were loaded with value premises and contained a variety 
of meanings that were difficult to discern, at least in the Nigerian case. Did 
national integration necessarily have to engender peace, stability, and harmo-
nization of interethnic relations in a nation-state? Better still, could na.tional 
integration ipso facto eliminate national conflicts in a polity, ifinterethnic antag-
onisms were primordial? Oyovbaire then suggested that, conceptually, national 
cohesion was a better tool for analyzing the Nigerian case: "First, definitionally, 
cohesion means simply the existence of a norma.tive or value basis for a people 
to keep together-a tendency or demonstrated willi~ness to hold together in 
order to maintain a.nd foster complementary interests m existence as a commu-
nity. Therefore, unlike na.tional integra.tion, nationa.l cohesion does not presume 
harmonized or integra.ted interests .... Rega.rdless of how in the first place people 
came or were brought together, national cohesion is simply an a.cknowledge-
ment of the minimum need to resolve the problems of collective actions in order 
to achieve some presumed or agreed common goals with an increasing degree 
of trust and predictability. Secondly, the theoretical value of the concept of 
national cohesion is that it opens up a. much better basis for evaluating the 
manner in which successive governing classes in Nigeria have come to view and 
a.rticulate politics and the country's political process."(40) 
This argument may be visualized in two ways. First, as long as a num-
ber of ethnic groups compose a. nation-state, there ma.y be clashes of interests, 
which ma.y induce these units to exhibit certain antagonistic behaviour pat-
terns. But since they inhabit a.n identical milieu, they must seek mutual toler-
ance. A good example of such a social accommodation by ethnic groups is the 
relationship among Yugoslavia's various nationalities (Bosnians, Herzegovini-
ans, Croatians, Ma.cedonians, Montenegrins, Serbians, and Slovenians).(41) Al-
though these groups maintain various forms of ethnic autonomy, their rela-
tionships are genera.lly marked by mutual cooperation.(42) Furthermore, this 
view approxima.tes wha.t sociologists term social plura.lism, i. e., a political sys-
tem in which different ethnic, ra.cial, and religious groups reside under a simi-
lar cultural system, while ma.intaining and respecting each others' peculiarities 
and cultural identities.(43) Second, it could be a.rgued tha.t national cohesion 
formed part of a. metamorphic process tha.t started during the periond of an-
ticolonial solidarity a.nd nationa.lism and has continued to the present among 
colonial peoples; and tha.t na.tional integration might be the ultimate goal or 
utopia, perhaps in the same sense as communism beckoned to the socialist states 
of eastern Europe. Thus, one ma.y represent the historical transformations in 
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the following sequence: nationalism-independence-ethnic nationalism-national 
cohesion-national integration.(44) 
Oonceptually, national cohesion may be observed against the background 
of traditional African societies, in which ethnic units fought to maintain their 
"sovereignty" and ethnic identities. It was fundamentally in the realm of trade 
and commerce that interethnic relations were marked by mutual cooperation. 
However, in precolonial and colonial times, the drive for territorial claims re-
sulted in antagonistic behaviour patterns among ethnic groups.(45) In many 
cases, such conflicts spilled over into the postcolonial periods. Furthermore, the 
colonial powers and administrators did little to foster a sense of identity with 
the new territorial entities among the diverse collectivities.(46) In fact, in some 
cases the colonial powers incited interethnic conflicts by playmg off one group 
against the other, in order to check the actions of a recalcitrant group. 
What has made it difficult for national integration to occur and national co-
hesion to persist, stems from the socialization process within the various groups. 
The socialization process underscores the basic mechanisms and rituals required 
for the group's security and survival. For example, Victor Olorunsola's study 
of traditional political systems among the Hausa-Fulani, Ibos, and Yorubas of 
Nigeria discovered that, within the political mix, the Hausa-Fulani political 
system was despotic, theocratic, and authoritarian; the Ibo was republican, 
equalitarian, individualistic, and achievement-orientedj and the Yorubas basi-
cally preferred a constitutional monarchy.(47) For many years their socialization 
patterns continued to support the system within their various regions. These 
characteristics, therefore, tended to reinforce the groups' non-centripetal pulls 
in the period before and after independence. The outcome of the socialization 
process would be reflected in the structure of the political parties.(48) 
L. Rubin and B. Weinstein have alluded to Western political scientists' eth-
nocentric approach to the study of political systems in Africa.(49) They noted 
that these scholars refused to study non-Western societies because they did not 
observe anything resembling the Western-type institutions in the non-Western 
world. Thus, the strategy was to amalgamate the various African groups as 
entities lacking political institutions.(50) Little wonder, then, that following in-
dependence, many political leaders, especially within the pan-Africanist move-
ment, portrayed traditional African society as being homogeneous. The ar-
gument for this approach, according to C. Potholm, was based on the claim 
that these societies shared identical assumptions about the nature of human 
collectivities.(51 ) 
Perhaps it was such an assumption regarding African homogeneity that 
prompted the late President Sekou Toure of Guinea to offer an optimistic prog-
nosis of the Guinean case after independence. He said: "in three or four years, 
no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rivalries which, in the recent 
past, caused so much damange to our country and its politics."(52) Similarly, 
after independence in Uganda, the government's official policy proclaimed that 
ethnicity no longer existed.(53) 
To some degree, the process of colonial "socialization" made it difficult for 
the newly appointed or elected leaders to comprehend the extent of ethnic loyal-
ties that created problems with regard to their abilities to govern their polities. 
This was manifested in the attitude that Western-educated leaders were capa-
ble of remedying the effect of ethnic cleavages with respect to ethnic interests. 
But the drive towards cultural pluralism prompted C. Potholm to contend that 
" ... the diversity of traditional African political forms and the basic political plu-
ralism that characterized African political thought in its traditional settings is 
both manifest and considerable .... Often ethnic strife has been exacerbated or 
in some cases muted precisely because of the nature of the traditional political 
system of that subnational unit. In other words, the basic pluralism of African 
political systems remains a fact of life, one that the statesmen and politicians 
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ignore at their peril."(54) 
The argument posited here with respect to the national cohesion framework 
for analyzing the Nigerian case siems from the assumption that African tradi-
tional social patterns tended to mitigate the national integration process. This 
is so, because the traditional socializing process underscored parochial loyalties. 
The advent of independence in Nigeria and elsewhere did not dissolve ethnicity. 
If anything, it strengthened the ethnic walls as the va.rious groups competed 
for socioeconomic and political powers in the modernization process.(55) For 
now, at least, it was an illusion to assume that ethnic loyalties would wither 
away, not because of the undersirability of such an event, but because of the 
impracticalities inherent in the politics of Nigeria. 
The quest for a solution to the national integration problem prompted the 
Nigerian government to confront the issue with the 1979 Constitution. In a 
way, this approach indicated the complexity of the matter and demonstrated 
the difficulty in resolving it by other means. The 1979 Constitution presented 
a structural approach to solving the question of ethnopolitics in Nigeria. This 
was, for example, reflected in the party structure.(56) In reality, it represented an 
attempt to control the centrifugal forces of ethnicity, with a view to establishing 
a viable democracy in the country. 
The spirit of the Constitution may be best summarized within the assump-
tions and hypotheses propounded by James R. Scarritt and William Safran. 
They note that ethnic political mobilization and ethnically-based control of po-
litical institutions would be less likely to hinder further modernization or sig-
nificantly strain democracy, and may facilitate both, if they 
1. ... occur within, exist alongside, or help produce several in-
stitutionalized, powerful interest groups which draw their members 
from all or most ethnic identity groups in the society in sufficient 
numbers that these interest groups are popularly identified as cross-
ethnic or non-ethnic; 
2 .... occur within, exist alongside, or help produce one or more 
cross-ethnic, institutionalized political parties or stable coalitions 
among parties which are able to control government, usually through 
controlling a majority of seats in the legislature; [and) 
3. ...occur in the presence of or help produce a cross-ethnic 
leadership cadre of politicians and civil servants who are perceived 
by themselves and by the public as able to work together effectively 
in spite of ethnic differences without compromising any member's 
standing in his or her own ethnic identity group .... (57) 
Indeed, one of the problems of the First Republic's constitution was that it 
embraced the zero-sum game, especially with respect to the legislative structure 
and its dominant executive. In this constitutional framework, the loser wa.s 
almost totally "frozen" out of the political process and denied the prestige that 
comes with being in power. Since the political parties wereformed on the basis 
of ethnic cleavages, election results were often contested. The outcome was 
generally disintegrative, which created problems of legitimacy. 
The constitution of the Second Republic, however, attempted to eschew 
these dimensions by introducing the presidential system with three centres of 
relatively equal powers (legislative, judicial, and executive).(58) Also inserted 
in the constitution were a.ppropriate provisions designed to assuage the fears 
of various minority groups in Nigeria.(59) In this case, encouragement of croll-
sethnic participation of all groups in national politicll, while each maintained 
its ethnic identity, became accentuated. Chapter 2, Article 15 (2-3) of the 19~9 
Constitution, recognized that national cohesion may be part of a metamorphlc 
process that thrived during the colonial era and that national integration might 
be anticipated in the resulting political change: "Accordingly, national inte-
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gration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on grounds of place 
of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be 
prohibited .... " The Constitution also sta.ted in Chapter 1 that Nigeria would 
remain a federal republic and an indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state. 
But it was not quite clear what function the federal structure would play in the 
process of national integration. 
Theoretically, federalism has served as a technique for aggregating large 
areas under one government for a common objective. In his study on the op-
portunities and problems of federation, A. H. Birch defined a federation as a 
"constitutional system in which there is a division o£legislative powers between 
one general and several regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, 
is a coordinate with the others, and each of which acts directly on the people 
through its own administrative agencies."(60) 
In a real sense, a paradox exists when the nature of the federal system of 
government vi,-d·vi. national integration is considered. Henry Teune has noted 
that both federalism and decentralization were relational terms, having refer-
ence to characteristics of subunits of government, each of which was related 
to a general government.(61) In the case of Nigeria, the discussion of federal-
ism issued from the "autonomy" of the nation-state subunits.(62) Such an au-
tonomous posture of the regions (or states) would tend to undermine any unity 
that was anticipated in a system that attempted national integration because 
of possible centrifugal aspects of their interests.(63) 
Carl Friedrich has also stated that the idea of a compact was inherent in 
federalism, and that the constituent power which made the compact took the 
place of the sovereign.(64) The complexity of the federal system, therefore, may 
lie in the nature of the compact. For example, was the compact to be based 
on a political system that opted for a centralized form of federalism offering 
more influence and power to the leaders of the federation than to the rulers of 
the governments of the subunits? Would it be based on a political system that 
a.dopted a peripheral federalism in which more power was offered to the rulers 
of the subordinate governments, who then would possess superior influence over 
the functions of the entire society than the leaders of the federation? In theory, 
the 1979 Constitution emphasized a centralized form of federalism, but histori-
cally, the central government has had problems with this structure on a number 
of occasions.(65) 
The creation of states in Nigeria should be seen against the backdrop of Carl 
Friedrich's explanation of the purpose of a federation. A federation, according 
to Friedrich, is a union of group selves united by one or more common objectives, 
but retaining their distinctive group-being for other purposes. Federation is on 
the intergroup level. It unites without destroying the selves that are uniting, 
and is mea.nt to strengthen them in their mutual relations.(66) 
By creating thirteen states, the Yakubu Gowan administration attempted 
to address the concern of minoritYJroups and to strengthen the federation. 
Furthermore, it was an effort to de with the issue of the "Biafra" secession 
and to eliminate the minorities' fears of being dominated by the larger ethnic 
groups. The movement for the creation of sta.tes on the basis of ethnic groupings 
dates to the preindependence period, but gathered steam after the Civil War, 
when the number of states reached nineteen under the Murtala Muhammed 
administration. 
Article 15(3) further addressed the issue of Nigerian national integration. 
For the purpose of promoting national integration it shall be the duty of the 
state to (a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, 
goods and services throughout the federation; (b) secure full residence rights for 
every citizen in all parts of the federation; (c) encourage intermarriage among 
persons from different religions, ethnic or linguistic associations or ties; and 
(d) promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, 
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linguistic, religious, or other barriers. These strategies for attaining national 
integration might prove to be inadequate for the purpose for which they were 
formulated. 
Interregional movements of peoples have been proceeding since time im-
memorial in Africa. In Nigeria, migration from one region to another will con-
tinue regardless of any legislation. But what is particularly important is whether 
the group that exchanged one milieu for another would shed its ethnic identity 
and adapt to the culture of the dominant group. In other words, is it possible, 
for example, for the Hausa-Fulanis who migrate from the north to the south to 
adopt the southern culture, so that they become, in effect, culturally integrated 
into the new milieu? Incidentally, migrants to the southern cities have tended to 
protect their identities by living exclusively among their kin in residential seg-
regation. The same may be said of the IboB who migrated to the north prior to 
the Civil War. Such segregation promotes cultural pluralism and retards social 
contacts deemed significant for improving the various groups' mutual under-
standing and behaviour patterns. Increased mutual understanding, one might 
argue, would promote integration. 
As Abner Cohen has noted, there appears to be a paradox in the sociocul-
tural intercourse among Africa's ethnic groups. This paradox stems from what 
he terms two contradictory phenomena: one group that surrenders its cultural 
identity and adopts the values and customs of other r;roups, and the other is one 
that maintains its cultural identity and emphasizes Its exclusivity.(67) Possibly, 
the 1979 Constitution aimed more at the former. However, the latter appears 
to be the prevailing attitude in Nigeria. Max Gluckman has also noted that 
cultural survivability is significant in any society, and thus "when people from 
one cultural group migrate to towns they retain a great deal of their culture 
even without necessarily forming a corporate political group."(68) He contends 
that they therefore form ethnic categories. 
The encouragement of intermarriage among persons from different places of 
origin as an integrative factor is tenuous, although not unimportant. In reality, 
intermarriage had long been common before colonialism but was not really a 
melding factor among ethnic groups. Cynthia Enloe has noted that in terms of 
socioeconomic advantage intermarriage might be helpful, because it could result 
in the upward mobility of either party, based on social status.(69) 
Nigerian society is basically patrilineal and patrilocal.(70) The female spouse 
is expected to become part and parcel of the man's group. In fact, she may have 
to give up her former ethnic identity. And in terms of politics, the male spouse 
would be ~aining a convert, who in most cases must necessarily join the man 
in the pohtical struggle for power. This refers to the rural, social, political, 
and cultural norms. Although the rural population forms the grassroots of 
the political system, its members are those who least understand the national 
integration process. 
Two major problems stem from this constitutional demand. First, it is diffi-
cult to legislate interethnic marriages, because it is a very sensitive and personal 
matter. Second, even when interethnic marriages take place, the political effect 
in terms of integrating two or more ethnic groups may be too infinitesimal to 
have any major impact on national integration. 
The last factor in article 15(2-3) deals with the promotion or encouragement 
of association formation that transcends ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other 
sectional barriers. This, in particular, relates to the functioning of the political 
parties. Since the operation of the political parties in the Second Republic was 
relatively short-lived, their impact as vehicles for national integration could not 
be fully measured. 
The function off political parties as forces for the mobilization of the masses 
is well known.(71) The purpose for which parties mobilize the people could make 
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or break the system, especially in plural societies. This was particularly the 
case in Nigeria during the period preceding independence and after, when the 
political parties were ethnically based. In part, this arrangement contributed 
to the political malaise and the crisis of 1967-1970. The problem stemmed 
from the manner in which the political parties were aligned. Claude Ake has 
noted: "One way of determining empirically the level ofintegration of a political 
system is to analyze its politiciil alignment pattern. The major emphasis here 
is based on the extent to which political parties are cut across tribal and ethnic 
groups. If this analysis reveals, by and large, that the major competing political 
organizations draw their support from a diversity of socio-cultural and regional 
groups, the political system is likely to be highly integrated."(72) 
According to this formula, then, the preindependence and post-independence 
Nigerian political system was not integrated. In order to address this issue, the 
political parties were constitutionally charged with the task of bringing about 
unity in their patterns of political recruitment. This was necessary if the polit-
ical parties wished to become national in scope and character. Article 14(2) of 
the constitution states "That the composition of the Government of the Feder-
ation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out 
in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to 
promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring 
that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few 
ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies." 
This constitutional provision served as the basis for the following guide-
lines, especially as they concerned the need for the political parties to assume 
a national character: (a) Membership of political parties must be open to every 
citizen of Nigeria irrespective of place of origin, sex, religion or ethnic group; 
(b) Names, emblems, and mottos of parties must not contain ethnic or rdigious 
connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the parties are limited 
to the geographical areas of the country; (c) The headquarters of parties must 
be located in the country's Capital Territory [so that their activities could be 
closely monitored by the Federal Electoral Commissionl; and (d) The constitu-
tion of political parties must ensure that members of executive committee or 
other governing body reflect the federal character of the country .... 
During the First Republic, the constitution of the National Council of Nige-
ria and the Camerouns was framed in such a way that membership in the party 
was more readily open to groups (tribal unions and labour unions), and less to 
individuals. The argument in favour oIthe political parties was national in scope 
and character. It rested on the assumption that it would help eliminate or at 
least reduce the effect of symbols that marked the politics of the previous party 
system. It was evident that if the parties remained open to all Nigerians, then 
they would permit members of any ethnic group to join the political party that 
best suited the group's or individual's political interest and philosophies. As 
soon as ethnic symbols were eliminated and political parties became headquar-
tered in the country's capital, chances were that "cytoplasmic" or peripheral 
allegiance would be minimized, and "nucleotic" allegiances encouraged. 
The concept of nucleo-cytoplasmic allegiance is relevant in Nigeria's polit-
ical matrix.(73) This is so because of Nigeria's relatively low literacy rate.(74) 
Symbols and personality rather than policies or ideology sometimes become the 
rallying cry of ethnic politicians. This necessitates the need to "nationalize" 
symbols.(75) The question is not whether politicians subscribe to the views of 
a particular party, but whether they see the national parties as representing 
national interests and indirectly theirs, even when the political party they sup-
port is not in power. If and when this becomes at least the perception of most 
Nigerians, then the path towards maximal unity would have been paved. 
The issue of ethnic politics in Nigeria and elsewhere (the Basque in France 
and Spain, the Irish, Welsh, and Scots in the United Kingdom, to name a few) 
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may never disappear.(76) Yet Nigeria remains a regional power, and a genuine 
political force on the African continent.(77) This makes the search for a viable 
democracy and political stability a major task for the government. Nigeria has a 
peculiar situation, however, in that it has three dominant ethnic groups (Hausa. 
Fulani, lbo, and Yoruba) and numerous smaller groups. Attempts to reconcile 
the interests of these subnational groups can be very difficult sometimes, and 
the outcome can result in centrifugal tendencies. 
So much has been written by so many, yet so few seem to have provided 
a major solution to the problem of ethnic politics and national integration. 
Perhaps this is due to the fact that the subject matter is complex, and hence 
intimidating. In fact, Larry Diamond's disquieting conclusion on ethnicity, with 
respect to the 1983 Nigerian elections, epitomized the gravity of the problem 
that it poses for democracy and national integration in Nigeria.(78) On the one 
hand, national cohesion permits each collectivity to function "autonomously" 
by allowing social and cultural advancement, while simultaneously recognizing 
the existence of a higher polity (the nation-state). Constitutionally, on the other 
hand, national integration still remains the elusive objective of Nigerian leaders. 
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TABLE 1 
MAJOR ETHNOLINGUISTIC CATEGORIES 
(in per cent of total population)l 
Ethnolinguistic Category:! 
Hausa ..................................................... . 
Yoruba .................................................... . 
Ibo (Igbo) ................................................. . 
Fulani (Ful be ) ............................................. . 
Kanuri ...•.....................................•........... 
Ibibio ...................................................... . 
Tiv ............................•............................ 
Ijaw (Ijo) .................................................. . 
Edo (Bini) .............•.................................... 
Anaang '" .............•.................................... 
Nupe ...................................................... . 
Urhobo ...................................•................. 
Iga.la ...................................................... . 
Idoma ..................................................... . 
Ebira (Egbirra) ............................................ . 
Gwari ..................................................... . 
Ekoi (Ejagham) ............................................ . 
Mumuye ....................................•............... 
Alago ..........•.............•.............................. 
Ogoni (kana) ...................................•........... 
Isoko , ..................................................... . 
Subtotal ................................................... . 
Others3 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Total ...................................................... . 
Per cent 
21.0 
20.4 
16.6 
8.6 
4.1 
3.6 
2.5 
2.0 
1.7 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.0 
.9 
.B 
.7 
.6 
.5 
.4 
.4 
.3 
89.7 
10.3 
100.0 
Source: Based on information from Nigeria. Federal Ministry of Information, 
Nigeria: 1978 - 1979 Official Handbook (Lagos, 1979), pp. 273-274. 
Adapted from Harold D. Nelson, ed., Nigeria, A Country Study (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1982), p. 291. 
1 All catego:des listed comprised 200,000 persona or more in 1963, the year of the 
last official census. 
lNamcs in parentheses are commonly used alternatives. 
3 An additional fifteen ethnolinguiatic categories, each comprising between 100,000 
IlIld 200,000 persons in 1963, constituted about 4% of the population. 
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Table 2 
SELECTED ETRNOLINGUISTIC CATEGORIES 
DISTRIBUTION BY STATES 
Ethnolinguistic 
Category 
Rausa 
Yoruba 
Ibo 
Fulani 
Kanuri 
Ibibio 
Tiv 
Ijaw 
State 
Niger, Sakata, Kaduna, Bauchi, 
Barno, Gongola, Kwara, Kana 
Benue, and Platea.u. 
Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, and Bendel. 
Anambra, lmo, and Cross Rivers. 
The six northern states: Sokoto, 
Kana, Barno, Kaduna, Niger, a.nd 
Bauchi. 
Bauchi and Barno 
Cross Rivers 
Benue and Platea.u 
Rivers and Bendel 
Source: Walmark Encyclopedia of the NationB: Africa (New York: Walmark 
Press, 1984), p. 236. 
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Table 2 
SELECTED ETHNOLINGUlSTIC CATEGORIES 
DISTRIBUTION BY STATES 
Ethnolinguistic 
Category 
Rausa 
Yoruba 
Ibo 
Fulani 
Kanuri 
Ibibio 
Tiv 
Ijaw 
State 
Niger, Sokoto, Kaduna, Bauchi, 
Borno, Gongola, Kwara, Kano 
Benue, and Plateau. 
Ogun, Onde, Oye, and Bendel. 
Anambra, Imo, and Cross Rivers. 
The six northern states: Sokoto, 
Kano, Borno, Kaduna, Niger, and 
BauchL 
Bauchi and Borno 
CroSB Rivers 
Benue and Plateau 
Rivers and Bendel 
Source: Walmark Encyclopedia of the Nation,: Africa (New York: Wahnark 
Press, 1984), p. 236. 
